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FAIRLY SHARING 

AFFORDABLE HOUSING OBLIGATIONS: 

THE MOUNT LAUREL MATRIX 

JOHN M. PAYNE* 
INTRODUCTION 
New Jersey's Mount Laurel doctrine1 requires every municipal­
ity in the state to provide a realistic opportunity for the construc­
tion of its fair share of the regional need for low- and moderate­
income housing. This doctrine is probably the best known afforda­
ble-housing initiative of our time, and without a doubt the most 
ambitious judicial ruling in the field of land use controls since 
World War II. This Symposium provides a timely reminder, how­
ever, that before there was even a trial court decision in the case 
that became Mount Laurel I, Massachusetts led the way with chap­
ter 774, the Comprehensive Permit Law.2 
My contribution to these thirtieth anniversary proceedings is to 
share with you the news from New Jersey. The Mount Laurel doc­
trine and the Comprehensive Permit Law are rough contemporaries 
and comparisons are therefore in order. I cannot offer anything 
that compares to the wealth of specific data that Dean Krefetz 
presents in her Article3 because, surprisingly, there has never been 
a comprehensive, hard number study of Mount Laurel's results. 
Still, the outlines are clear, and I will sketch the general picture with 
a concentration on a broader view. 
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School - Newark. © 2001 John M. Payne. 
1. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 
(N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 11]; S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 1]. 
2. Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, 1969 Mass. Acts 774 (current version 
at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1998)). This article will observe the proprieties 
and refer to this law by its "grown-up" title. However, I was in law school some miles 
east of Springfield in 1969; when chapter 774 was enacted amid controversy. Conse· 
quently, the law will always carry for me its cumbersome but wonderfully pointed birth 
name, the "Anti-Snob Zoning Law." 
3. Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts Com­
prehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State Leg­
islative Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. (forth­
coming 2001). 
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Breaking down exclusionary zoning barriers and encouraging 
the provision of low- and moderate-income housing is a tough busi­
ness. One of the remarkable things about Mount Laurel as well as 
the Comprehensive Permit Law is that both have survived in illib­
eral political times for as long as they have. I suspect they have 
survived because both the New Jersey and Massachusetts ap­
proaches have matured, reaching a level of predictable results and 
few surprises in the current political climate which does not support 
new initiatives. This is certainly true of New Jersey. In the expecta­
tion of better days ahead, however, I propose that we look forward, 
beyond the focus of local zoning that is at the core of both the 
Mount Laurel doctrine and the Comprehensive Permit Law, to see 
what else can be done. Drawing on my New Jersey experiences, I 
will present these suggestions within what I call the Mount Laurel 
matrix. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MOUNT 

LAUREL DOCTRINE. 

The Mount Laurel "story" has been discussed at great length in 
recent years,4 and so only the briefest recap is necessary to set the 
scene here. Although post-war suburban exclusionary policies were 
driven by a mixture of race and class fears, in 1975, Southern Bur­
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel ("Mount 
Laurel/") chose the broader focus of income level rather than race, 
assuming that solving one problem would solve the other at the 
same time. Mount Laurel I also implicitly rejected the Massachu­
setts approach, pegging the constitutional obligation to "regional 
fair share," rather than to the fixed percentages of chapter 774. 
Eight years later, in the face of massive non-compliance, 
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 
("Mount Laurel II") added a sweeping set of remedies which suc­
cessfully forced the issue. Although the court retained the "fair 
share" approach of Mount Laurel I, it partially came around to the 
Massachusetts model (again, without saying so) to the extent that 
the court required each municipality's fair share to be quantified as 
a specific number and held that constitutional compliance was to be 
measured objectively in terms of whether that numerical goal had 
4. See CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDA­
CIOUS JUDGES (1996); DAVID L. KJRP ET AL., OUR ToWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE 
SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995). 
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been achieved.s The court also embraced the concept of "inclusion­
ary zoning" as a method of compliance for municipalities which 
otherwise could not meet their fair share obligations.6 The court 
held that such municipalities must take affirmative steps to satisfy 
their obligations.7 This co-option of the private housing economy 
also distinguishes the New Jersey approach from that of the Massa­
chusetts approach, which has concentrated on opening the subur­
ban door to public and non-profit developments that are totally 
occupied by lower-income households. 
Mount Laurel II worked as the Supreme Court intended. 
Within eighteen months after the Supreme Court announced its 
opinion, specially-assigned trial judges worked out a formula for 
calculating fair shares.8 Shortly thereafter, individual municipalities 
began getting the bad news about specific court-ordered changes in 
their land use plans. With the handwriting on the wall, the legisla­
ture entered the fray with the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 
1985.9 This Act created a Council on Affordable Housing 
("COAH"),l0 to administer a new system of nominally voluntary 
compliance, backed up by a presumption that municipalities with 
affordable housing plans certified by COAH would be relieved of 
litigation in Superior CourtY COAH, by administrative rulemak­
ing, left the court-developed procedures for calculating fair share 
largely intact,12 but by careful attention to detail, it was able to 
drastically reduce the estimated need for low- and moderate-in­
come units. Doing so lowered fair share numbers significantly for 
many communities, thus fulfilling one of the unstated purposes of 
COAH.13 
COAH also administers a system known as Regional Contribu­
tion Agreements ("RCAs"), which permits suburban municipalities 
to satisfy up to 50% of their fair share obligation by funding afford­
5. See Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 421-22. 
6. Id. at 446-49. 
7. See id. at 447-48. 
8. AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 504 A.2d 692, 696-704 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) (enacted July 
2, 1985). 
10. Id. § 52:27D-305. 
11. See id. § 52:27D-317. 
12. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93 (1999) (setting forth the COAH fair share 
rules in their current form). 
13. See John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Af­
fordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 29-30 (1987) (explaining how the fair 
share numbers were lowered). 
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able housing in urban areas.14 Mount Laurel II did not address 
RCAs, and though they are segregative in intent and effect, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has avoided the opportunity to declare 
them invalid.15 The inclusion of RCAs in the Mount Laurel process 
mandated by the legislature underscores with deep irony the deci­
sion made by the court in 1975 not to address the problem of exclu­
sionary zoning as a racial issue.16 
II. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED? 
There has been no comprehensive study of the results achieved 
by the Mount Laurel doctrine, but several partial surveys, coupled 
with the informed assessment of affordable-housing advocates in 
New Jersey, yield a reasonably accurate pictureP Since 1985, ap­
proximately 15,000 to 20,000 publicly-funded units of affordable 
low- and moderate-income housing units have been created; this 
compares favorably with the rate of creation in the heyday of the 
public-housing program prior to 1985.18 A largely unintended by­
product of the creation of Mount Laurel housing has been the crea­
tion of a substantial amount of middle-income housing in suburban 
areas, consisting of market-rate units in inclusionary developments 
that would not have been permitted by the municipality but for the 
Mount Laurel obligation.19 In addition, close to $120 million has 
been infused into urban areas.20 At the present time, the RCA 
funds constitute the largest single source of housing subsidy money 
in New Jersey. 
14. See § 52:27D-312. 
15. See In re Township of Warren, 622 A.2d 1257, 1269 (N.J. 1993) (disposing of 
the issue on other grounds). 
16. See John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1685, 1707-09 (1998) (reviewing HAAR, supra note 4 and discussing the race issue). 
17. See generally John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning and the 
Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REv. 665 (1996). A 
more recent study focused on the characteristics of the occupants of the Mount Laurel 
units, rather than the number of units created. See Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eis­
dorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of 
Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268 (1997). 
18. COAH's website claims 23,100 Mount Laurel units have been built or are 
under construction. The Council on Affordable Housing, at http://www.state.nj.us/dca/ 
coah.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000). COAH's monitoring capacity is limited by its 
very small staff, however, and its counts tend to be a bit optimistic. See Payne, supra 
note 17, at 672. 
19. See Martha Lamar et aI., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New 
Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197, 1260 (1989). 
20. See The Council on Affordable Housing, supra note 18. The Council reports 
some 6300 RCA units financed with these funds. See id. 
369 2001] THE MOUNT LAUREL MATRIX 
Most privately-developed Mount Laurel units are offered for 
sale, rather than as rentals, especially those occupied by families. 
Public subsidies are still available for senior citizen developments, 
which are often in rental form as a result. Mount Laurel units are 
occupied almost exclusively by non-minority families who previ­
ously lived in the suburbs fairly close to the inclusionary develop­
ment site. Very few households earning less than 40% of the 
median income have benefited from Mount Laurel. One recent 
study even noted that some minority households (but no non-mi­
nority ones) moved from a suburban area to an urban Mount Lau­
rel unit,21 
III. THE MOUNT LAUREL MATRIX. 
An important distinction between New Jersey's affordable­
housing history and that of both Massachusetts and Connecticut is 
the key role that the New Jersey Supreme Court played in both 
putting the process into effect and keeping it going. It is this judi­
cial involvement that accounts for the degree of success that the 
Mount Laurel doctrine has enjoyed, for there can be no doubt that 
the legislature would have abandoned the fair share process alto­
gether had it been constitutionally permissible to do so. 
But if judicial involvement is the source of our success, it is 
also, in the perverse way that so often affects law reform litigation, 
the source of our failure as well. Court-mandated housing policies 
lack even the slender political legitimacy that the New England 
statutes can claim, and without political legitimacy, a process that 
directly affects so many people and policies in so many ways cannot 
be self-sustaining. Thus, in recent years, I have tried to puzzle out 
an approach to housing opportunity that preserves the benefits of 
judicial enforcement while correcting some of its flaws. 
As a threshold matter, any judicially-based housing strategy 
must note well the source of the legal obligation. Mount Laurel I's 
"general welfare" theory was straightforward, but in 1975 it could 
stretch only far enough to require the elimination of barriers to af­
fordable housing. When Mount Laurel II went beyond exclusion­
ary zoning and required that local governments use their power 
affirmatively to facilitate the provision of affordable housing, some­
thing more was required doctrinally. It would have been conve­
nient if that "something" had been the court's recognition of a 
21. See Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 17, at 1296. 
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constitutional entitlement requiring the government to be the pro­
vider of last resort for at least a minimum of human shelter needs, 
but the New Jersey Supreme Court conspicuously refused to state 
that such a right exists. Thus, we are left to infer what the "miss­
ing" constitutional right that lends support to the judicially-based 
obligation to act might be.22 
Although this essay is not the place for an extended explora­
tion of constitutional arguments, I believe that the Mount Laurel 
cases can be interpreted as standing for the "can do" principle­
that governments should do all that they can do, within reasonable 
limits of governmental capacity, to facilitate provision of shelter for 
those who need it. This hypothesis is implied by the "general wel­
fare" doctrine that underlies Mount Laurel I, and it is completely 
consistent with the court's embrace of inclusionary zoning in Mount 
Laurel II as something within the power of local governments. In­
clusionary zoning, after all, requires nothing more than the combi­
nation of two standard zoning techniques-density regulation and 
use regulation.23 
Viewed through the lens of the "can do" principle, it becomes 
immediately apparent that different levels of government have the 
power to accomplish different things in different contexts without a 
court having to hold governmental actors to a standard beyond 
their constitutional capacity and without the court transgressing its 
own limits. Considered this way, the Mount Laurel doctrine is not 
about inclusionary developments, or subsidized housing, or any spe­
cific remedy for that matter. Rather, it is about the entire basket of 
remedies that the creative human mind can comprehend. 
Thus reinterpreted, a revised and expanded Mount Laurel doc­
trine can be described as a matrix, as opposed to a linear solution to 
the problem of affordable housing. As a first attempt to represent 
the matrix (I will modify it later), we can locate on one axis the 
major institutions of government involved in providing housing op­
portunities, and on the other axis, techniques for implementing af­
fordable-housing strategies. There are two cells on each axis: state 
government and local government on the "institutional" axis, and 
22. See, e.g., John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount 
Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 555, 555-56 (2000) (presenting a preliminary case 
for the existence of a constitutional right to shelter within the logic of the second Mount 
Laurel opinion). 
23. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-65(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000) (use); 
id. § 40:55D-65(c) (density); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.01 (4th ed., 
Lexis 1997). 
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regulatory techniques and subsidy techniques on the "implementa­
tion" axis. Thus, the matrix produces four possible combinations: 
(1) state regulation; (2) state subsidies; (3) local regulation; and (4) 
local subsidies. This can be rendered graphically: 
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
TECHNIQUE STATE MUNICIPALITY 
Regulation State regulation [Example: Local Regulation 
N.J. Fair Housing Act of [Example: inclusionary 
1985] zoning ordinance] 
Subsidy State subsidy [Example: Local subsidy [Example: 
low interest loans for first­ donation of surplus land 
time home buyers] to non-profit housing 
developer] 
By definition, the Mount Laurel doctrine, and hence Mount 
Laurel compliance, applies to public entities but not to private de­
velopers because public entities are bound by the state constitu­
tional obligation to serve the general welfare.24 Private developers, 
important as they are to the Mount Laurel compliance process, 
have no direct constitutional obligation under either Mount Laurel 
case. The general welfare restraint, as applied through the Mount 
Laurel doctrine, is an element of the police power, which only gov­
ernment can possess. Since the state constitution cannot bind the 
federal government, whose constitution apparently does not extend 
as far as New Jersey's,25 we are limited to considering only the state 
and its subdivisions. 
In principle, we could further say that the Mount Laurel doc­
trine applies only to the state itself (reversing, in effect, the current 
compliance regime) because the police power, and hence the gen­
eral welfare obligation, is an attribute of sovereignty, which the 
state alone possesses. But, as a practical matter, the state's sover­
eign power to regulate the use of land is so frequently and thor­
oughly passed through to the local level of government (a 
delegation that is unlikely to be reversed anytime soon) that it 
makes sense to treat local governments as a distinct entity for pur­
poses of constructing a practical and effective approach to Mount 
24. See Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 725. 
25. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (stating that the federal consti­
tution does not mandate adequate housing). 
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Laurel compliance. Agencies of the state, such as the New Jersey 
Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency, and sub-units of the state, 
such as counties, are also equally relevant. However, since these 
agencies and sub-units are sufficiently subject to direct state con­
trol, it is possible to speak of "the state" as a generic institution for 
simplicity of analysis. 
Having thus defined the categories, it is nonetheless important 
to keep in mind that this mode of classification is a matter of analyt­
ical convenience, not one of constitutional dimension. Specifically, 
this means that the state is not free to cast local governments adrift 
to comply with the Mount Laurel doctrine or not as their local incli­
nations dictate subject to being "caught" by the state courts only if 
successful litigation is brought.26 Nevertheless, the state has, in ef­
fect, cast local governments adrift throughout the Mount Laurel era 
subject only to the oversight of state courts during litigation.27 As 
will be seen, significant aspects of the methodology I propose turn 
on the primacy of the state's Mount Laurel obligation. Thus, the 
state and its local subdivisions form one axis of the matrix. 
Turning to the other axis, there are, broadly speaking, two 
types of power that either the state or local government can bring 
to bear on Mount Laurel compliance: the power to regulate private 
activities and the power to raise or spend public resources. Both 
state and local governments can regulate the activities of the private 
and semi-private housing market to socially useful ends. Under 
current regimes of land use policy, however, the heavy lifting of 
land use regulation is left to the local rather than to the state level, 
which explains why the Mount Laurel compliance system is based 
on inclusionary zoning-a type of local regulation. 
By placing inclusionary zoning within the more complex matrix 
I have described, it becomes apparent that Mount Laurel compli­
ance need not be limited to this technique alone. As a result, I 
would argue that it is not appropriate for COAH to base its fair 
share calculations and compliance review procedures primarily on 
the premise that inclusionary zoning is the primary goal of the pro­
cess.28 Local governments have other regulatory techniques availa­
26. See In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 464 A.2d 1115, 1122 (N.J. 1983) (recognizing 
that "local [zoning] decisions 'must be consistent with statewide policies"') (quoting 
Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. 1981». 
27. See, e.g., Lusardi, 430 A.2d at 887 (striking down a local zoning ordinance 
which conflicted with state priorities). 
28. For instance, COAH essentially excuses municipal compliance to the extent 
that the municipality lacks "developable land" for inclusionary developments, without 
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ble to them. For instance, rent control is a potentially useful 
technique in older suburbs where inc1usionary zoning usually does 
not work well because of the lack of large development sites. Addi­
tionally, as I have indicated, the state has not only its own regula­
tory powers but also plenary control over the delegation of 
regulatory power to local governments. There is much to be ex­
plored here under the "can do" principle. 
Both state and local governments can also directly subsidize 
needed housing by building it themselves, by providing cash subsi­
dies to others to build it, or through direct subsidies to households 
to pay for it. Closely related to this spending power is the power to 
participate in available direct subsidy programs offered by higher 
units of government-most notably those of the federal govern­
ment. This kind of local, state, and federal cooperation regarding 
public-housing programs (direct subsidy) was very much at the 
heart of the court's expectations in the early 1970s regarding how 
Mount Laurel would be implemented.29 
IV. PRIVATE SHARES AND PUBLIC SHARES 
A new approach to Mount Laurel compliance can be formal­
ized by establishing a two-tier system of constitutional fair share 
obligations: one a "private share," recognizing the capacity of pri­
vate markets to meet low- and moderate-income housing needs if 
regulated in the general interest, and the other a "public share," 
recognizing the resource capacities that are uniquely governmental. 
In keeping with the matrix model, we must separately examine the 
extent to which each type of share, private and public, can be imple­
mented by the state itself and by each municipality acting under 
appropriate state supervision. The present practice of calculating a 
single "fair share" obscures the extent of a government's collective 
ability to meet shelter needs. Instead, we should list separately the 
public and private strands of "fair share" and require that they be 
met separately (although not necessarily as a numerical obligation 
in every instance). 
In essence, the two-tier system already exists, albeit only par-
requiring inquiry into alternative modes of compliance. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, 
§ 93-4.1, -4.2(d) (1999). 
29. See Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 734 ("We have in mind that there is at 
least a moral obligation in a municipality to establish a local housing agency pursuant to 
state law to provide housing for its resident poor now living in dilapidated, unhealthy 
quarters."); cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311(a)(7) (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) (author­
izing the use of federal or state subsidies for Mount Laurel compliance purposes). 
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tially and in a very chaotic form. The Mount Laurel doctrine has 
concerned itself almost exclusively with one cell of the matrix-pri­
vate market regulatory strategies at the local level, over-emphasiz­
ing inclusionary zoning. Where voluntary compliance has not been 
forthcoming, the New Jersey courts have been willing to mandate 
this one form of local regulatory effort. However, inclusionary zon­
ing is not an end in itself; it is only one example of how a local 
government can use its regulatory power if local governments have 
a judicially-enforceable constitutional obligation to do as much as 
they can. Consider some of the other market regulation techniques 
that might easily be required as part of a Mount Laurel compliance 
program: rent control laws, anti-gentrification laws, restrictions on 
condominium conversions, and zoning for "mobile" homes.3D All 
have the effect of either facilitating a low-cost housing market or 
preventing the tendency of the market to gravitate towards higher 
income uses.31 
In addition to these "private share" regulatory techniques, 
even at present, a local "public share" can occasionally be added in 
the form of direct or indirect housing subsidies, but only if the mu­
nicipality offers to provide them on a voluntary basis. Typically, the 
public share is in the form of money raised to fund RCAs, but other 
kinds of funding, such as municipal donation of surplus land to help 
write down the cost of a development, are also used.32 Guided er­
roneously by Mount Laurel II, courts have never seen it as their 
role to order these kinds of "public" shares; therefore, public funds 
have sometimes been injected into private inclusionary develop­
ments to reduce the developer's cost,33 rather than to make the 
homes available to more or poorer households than could be served 
by private development alone. Under the Mount Laurel doctrine, 
public funds should leverage, not take the place of, private effort. 
30. See Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 450 (endorsing zoning for mobile 
homes). 
31. COAH identifies a further list of local initiatives, although they are less ag­
gressive than the ones given in the text of the Mount Laurel compliance program (e.g., 
group homes and accessory apartments). See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93-5.8 to 5.12. 
Housing advocates tend to frown on these COAH-suggested alternatives, because they 
do not address the core need to provide opportunities for families with children, but 
this lack of enthusiasm would diminish if there were a broader range of solutions being 
pursued simultaneously, as proposed by the matrix model. 
32. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311(a)(5) to (a)(8); N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 5, § 93-5.5, 5.7 (municipal contributions). 
33. See, e.g., Lamar et aI., supra note 19, at 1242 (providing an example of a low­
income development program which gave its money to lenders who had special lending 
relationships with developers). 
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Beyond this, the cells in the proposed matrix are conceptually 
empty under current interpretations of the Mount Laurel doctrine 
and the state Fair Housing Act. Even if we assume that local zon­
ing will constitute the lion's share of land use regulation, thus 
shrinking the possibility for a state level "private share," a "can do" 
reading of the Mount Laurel doctrine dictates that the state require 
all municipalities to prepare and submit fair share plans to COAH, 
rather than, as at present, leaving compliance voluntary. COAH 
participation data shows that 128 of New Jersey's 567 municipalities 
were in compliance in August 1999.34 This strongly suggests that 
the incentives for voluntary participation are much too weak to be 
constitutionally adequate. 
However, the assumption that there is local control is far from 
completely accurate. For instance, states are increasingly imposing 
direct regulation (or regulatory oversight) in critical areas such as 
environmentally-sensitive coastal zones.35 No systematic attention 
has been paid to the use of indusionary zoning (or other lower­
income housing techniques) in these areas and no decisions require 
(as opposed to permit) such activities, even though the "realistic 
opportunities" are large and obvious.36 Moreover, the state's deci­
sions about the provision of crucial water and sewer infrastructure 
and road access to major developments certainly determine where 
and when development can occur; like an increasing number of 
states, New Jersey now embodies its infrastructure policies in a 
state master plan, to which Mount Laurel criteria have already been 
joined.37 Still, enforcement is lacking. The state also regulates con­
dominium conversions, without considering the impact that "going 
condo" has on poor residents in gentrifying communities.38 
34. See Payne, supra note 17, at 676-77; 128 Municipalities Have COAH's Ap­
proval, NEWSL. (N.J. Council on Affordable Hous.), Aug. 1999, at 2, available at http:// 
www.state.nj.us/dca/coahlarchive.htm. Many of these "certified" municipalities have 
very small fair shares, zero in some cases, thus underscoring the weak level of actual 
compliance. 
35. See, e.g., In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 464 A.2d 1115, 1116-17 (N.J. 1983). 
36. Id. at 1122 (holding that a state agency may require inclusionary zoning). The 
context of the case did not require consideration of the agency's obligation to require 
inclusionary zoning however. 
37. N.J. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, COMMUNITIES OF PLACE: THE NEW JERSEY 
STATE DEVELOPMENT AND REDEVELOPMENT PLAN (June 17, 1992) (SDRP); id. 
§ IV(B)(8), Policy 17 (indicating coordination with Council on Affordable Housing). 
Not surprisingly, however, the SDRP contrives not to utter the dread phrase "Mount 
Laurel" in its section on housing. 
38. See Comm. for Hous. Alternatives, Inc. v. Mayor of Jersey City (unpublished 
opinion), cert. denied, 570 A.2d 963 (N.J. 1989) (ruling that the City's attempt to regu­
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The potential is even more dramatic if one considers the possi­
bility of a state-level "public share," i.e., an obligation on the part of 
the state to finance affordable-housing production. The reason that 
presumably led the Mount Laurel court to forgo imposing financial 
obligations on municipalities applies with much less force at the 
state level. Local governments, heavily dependent on property tax 
revenues, cannot realistically be expected to devote substantial 
sums to social welfare programs. However, the state, with a budget 
in the billions and with access to elastic revenue sources such as an 
income tax, is already heavily invested in welfare spending and can­
not plausibly avoid review of the way in which it discharges its 
responsibilities. 
Even putting aside for the moment the particularly knotty 
question of whether a court can or should order new state spending 
on shelter needs, there is much that could be done within existing 
programs that the state already undertakes voluntarily by more rig­
orous means-testing. For instance, the New Jersey Housing and 
Mortgage Finance Agency establishes a threshold income eligibility 
level for a variety of assisted-housing programs that is not only in 
excess of the Mount Laurel ceiling of 80% of regional median in­
come, but in excess of median income altogether.39 This reflects the 
political popularity of directing aid to middle-class voters. 
With less boldness than was asked of the two Mount Laurel 
courts, a court today, guided by the "can do" principle and the 
Mount Laurel matrix, could readily hold that the middle-class skew 
in eligibility limits for these otherwise beneficial housing programs 
is unconstitutional by analogizing it to the unconstitutional skewing 
of the land use power found in exclusionary zoning. If the state 
were then given the choice of targeting a substantial portion of aid 
to the most needy households, those who are too poor to be served 
by the market mechanisms of inclusionary zoning alone, it is a fair 
late price of rental units converted to condominium status was preempted by state con­
dominium conversion law). 
39. In April, 1999, New Jersey median income measured in three- or four-county 
regions ranged between a low of $43,950 and a high of $69,030 for a family of three, and 
COAH's 80%/50% ceilings for moderate- and low-income eligibility, respectively, ac­
cordingly ranged between $35,160/21,975 and $55,224/34,515. 1999 Regional Income 
Limits, NEWSL. (N.J. Council on Affordable Hous.), Apr. 1999, at 2 available at http:// 
www.state.nj.us/dca/coahlarchive.htm. In July, 2000, HMFA's web page gave income 
eligibility limits between $66,600 and $92,920 for a variety of assisted programs that are 
described elsewhere on the website. See HFMA Home Buyer Mortgage Program: 2000 
Income Limits at http://www.state.nj.us/dcalhmfa/singfarnlinc_prch.html (last visited 
July 23, 2000). 
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bet that the legislature would choose to do so rather than shutting 
the programs down altogether.40 Note that, carefully crafted, the 
hypothetical judicial ruling I suggest need not cost the state a dime 
more than it presently appropriates. 
In theory, and perhaps in practice, this matrix approach could 
be expanded to distinguish different components of housing need­
determining a "private share" and a "public share" to satisfy each 
government's obligation to address distinct housing problems, such 
as substandard housing, cost-burdened households (those living in 
safe, sanitary housing but paying too high a portion of their income 
for the "privilege"), and homelessness. Doing so would illustrate 
that different compliance techniques, at different levels of govern­
ment, may be best suited to particular types of problems. Substan­
dard housing, for instance, invites a greater emphasis on new 
construction solutions, such as inclusionary zoning, than does cost 
burdensomeness, and homelessness might require financial solu­
tions that are largely, if not exclusively, within the capacity of state 
rather than local government. 
Such a detailed, expanded matrix, however, is beyond the 
scope of this essay. In fact, we may finally conclude it is neither 
necessary nor desirable to expand the matrix. One of the lessons of 
the Mount Laurel story is the risk of methodological hubris. As an 
attorney for one Mount Laurel plaintiffs' organization in the years 
immediately after Mount Laurel II, I participated in the develop­
ment of the original fair share formula.41 It was both a professional 
challenge and a great deal of fun to be there, but it is difficult to 
make policy by formula. By contrast, one of the advantages of the 
Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit approach is its methodologi­
cal simplicity. To construct every cell of a complex housing needs 
matrix and fill each cell with exquisitely tailored a priori solutions is 
to risk replicating on a larger scale the error which has led New 
Jersey to focus solely on inclusionary zoning and miss the bigger 
picture. My central purpose is to suggest an approach to fair share 
40. To give an egregious example, when the state's construction industry was in a 
serious recession in 1992, the legislature obligingly appropriated $200 million in con­
struction subsidies in what was called the Housing Incentive Finance Act, commonly 
called the "Fix the Hammer" Bill. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14K-45 to -63 (West Supp. 
2000). The Act expressly provided that in assisting developments, "no constraints may 
be placed on the marketing or pricing policy of a qualified housing developer." Id. 
§ 55:14K-50(d). 
41. See AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 504 A.2d 692, 694 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1984) (using the fair share formula to determine whether the municipal 
ordinance "fully complies with Mount Laure!"). 
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compliance that is more effective than the one currently em­
ployed-one that emphasizes the realistic capacity of government 
to address a broader array of housing needs with a greater selection 
of compliance techniques. If a more complex expression of this ap­
proach ultimately proves useful, it will be more sound to build it 
piece by piece, after the basics of the private share/public share con­
cepts have become better established. 
To summarize, we can restate the matrix, substituting the labels 
"private share" and "public share" for "regulation" and "subsidy," 
respectively, with an expanded set of examples which are nonethe­
less illustrative rather than complete. The shift to "private share" 
and "public share" labels that are not themselves compliance tech­
niques is intended to emphasize the idea behind the label in hopes 
that useful solutions like "regulation" or "subsidy" do not become 
ends in themselves as inc1usionary zoning has. 
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
STATE MUNICIPALITY 
"Private" 
Share 
N.J. Fair Housing Act of 
1985 
Inclusionary zoning 
Rent control 
(make compliance 
mandatory) 
Critical area zoning 
Infrastructure regulations 
Enforce SDRP policies 
Revise condominium laws 
Condo conversion controls 
Mobile/modular home zones 
(N.J.A.C. 5:93-5.8 to -5.12) 
"Public" 
Share 
Means-test existing programs 
Require local participation in 
existing subsidy programs 
Prepare shelter plan 
Expand direct subsidies? 
RCA funding 
Donate surplus land 
Waive fees/exactions 
Housing authority 
Purchase vacant units 
V. IMPLEMENTING THE MOUNT LAUREL MATRIX 
It remains to be considered, however, how "private shares" 
and "public shares" would be calculated, since some norm is neces­
sary if they are to be implemented by a court. As I have already 
suggested, the current fair share/inclusionary zoning regime func­
tions de facto as a "private share" methodology at the local level, 
although an unnecessarily narrow one. I have elsewhere argued 
that an alternative approach, called "growth share," would be pref­
erable because it would minimize the problems of "bad politics" 
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and "bad planning" that burden the current formulaic approach to 
fair share in New Jersey.42 "Growth share" is also a logical compo­
nent of the matrix approach in that it would encourage a search for 
compliance solutions that do not depend solely on new construction 
inclusionary developments. "Growth share" requires further elabo­
ration to be made workable, but for present purposes we need only 
realize that the "private/local" cell of the matrix can be filled with 
more than inclusionary zoning and that, however it is filled, inquiry 
about the full range of Mount Laurel compliance possibilities reach 
beyond that cell. 
As to the parallel "private" regulatory share that might be as­
signed to the state government as part of its newly recognized 
Mount Laurel obligation, I am inclined to leave that to ad hoc de­
termination as specific issues arise, in part because most land use 
regulation occurs at the local level and also because the concept of 
"share" is relatively inapposite when the state as a whole is consid­
ered; ultimately, the state's share is 100% of the need. Mount Lau­
rel I required the elimination of unnecessary, cost-generating fea­
tures in local ordinances,43 state statutes, and regulations. Like­
wise, practices that have adverse afford ability consequences should 
also be subject to judicial review (without a presumption of consti­
tutionality) on a case-by-case basis. One such provision clearly 
would be the "voluntariness" provision in the 1985 Fair Housing 
Act.44 
The real challenge is to find a useful concept of "public 
shares," which will amount to a judicially-enforceable obligation to 
subsidize affordable housing. Here, for fiscal capacity reasons, it 
will be much more meaningful to concentrate our attention on the 
state's obligations, rather than the municipalities' obligations. As­
suming that the state's "public share" obligation has been deter­
mined, it may suffice to require as the local "public share" that 
municipalities cooperate with all applicable state, and federal 
programs. 
42. See John M. Payne, Remedies for Affordable Housing: From Fair Share to 
Growth Share, 49 LAND USE & ZONING DIG. No.6, at 3-9 (June 1997). 
43. See Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 731-32 (noting that certain local zoning 
restrictions made it unrealistic for low-and moderate-income families to live in the 
Mount Laurel area). 
44. See Comm. for Hous. Alternatives, Inc. v. Mayor of Jersey City (unpublished 
opinion), cert. denied., 570 A.2d 963 (N.J. 1989). 
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CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the most controversial part of my proposed 
Mount Laurel matrix approach is my suggestion that courts man­
date access to the state's fiscal resources to resolve problems of 
housing afford ability. For present purposes, I concede that the judi­
cial process and separation of powers problems that inhere in or­
dering the state to pay a judicially-determined sum of money are 
significant enough that this should not be the first initiative upon 
implementing the Mount Laurel matrix, although there is more to 
be said at some later date about that intriguing question. It is not 
necessary to go that far. As I have suggested above,45 there are 
substantial opportunities to simply require the state to keep its pri­
orities straight within assistance programs that the legislature sees 
fit to fund. 
"Make no little plans." I surely do not expect to see my four­
part matrix adopted tomorrow in New Jersey or anywhere else. 
Keeping it in mind, however, we can discern more dearly how the 
Mount Laurel doctrine could reach its full potential. Perhaps those 
who gathered for this Symposium, in the spirit of those who dared 
in 1969 to propose the Comprehensive Permit Law, might be able 
to take the next steps toward that unimaginably bold goal-fair 
housing for all. 
45. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
suggestions. 
